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27 July 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

SUBJECT: Review of Overflight Reconnaissance

1. Attached for your information are papers on the above subject prepared by Mr. Ray Cline, Deputy Director (Intelligence), Central Intelligence Agency, in response to a request of the Director of Central Intelligence. These papers in a draft form were reviewed by the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance at its meeting of 16 July and proposed changes were made.

2. These papers, it is understood, were considered by the Special Group at its meeting on 19 July, its decision on them being recorded in the Minute of the Special Group meeting of that date.

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James Q. Reber
Chairman

Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

Attachments:
Subject Papers

Copies 2, 3--State TCO
4--DIA
5, 6, 7--DIA TCO
8--OACSI TCO
9--ONI TCO
10, 11--AFCIN TCO
12, 13--NSA TCO

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Overhead Reconnaissance

1. Attached are four memoranda on reconnaissance prepared according to your instructions and my understanding of General Taylor's wishes.

2. The net recommendation in these four memoranda is as follows:

a. Two flights (one weekly) in the Taiwan Straits area during the remainder of July 1962;

b. Regularly afterwards, if the situation is unchanged:

i. Taiwan Straits: subsequent coverage as the military situation suggests;

ii. South China: coverage bimonthly, requiring one flight monthly;

iii. Remainder of China: completion of initial coverage of the highest priority targets, requiring three flights, to be made approximately monthly;

iv. North Vietnam: coverage bimonthly, requiring one flight monthly;

v. Cuba: coverage monthly, requiring two flights monthly.

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c. The total requirement, beginning 1 August 1962, is for two flights monthly over Cuba, one flight monthly over North Vietnam, and approximately two monthly over China until initial coverage of highest priority targets has been completed, which should take only two or three months.

Obviously another comprehensive review should be undertaken about three months hence.

RAY S. CLINE
Deputy Director (Intelligence)

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Photographic Reconnaissance of
Taiwan Straits Buildup Area

1. At your direction, with the assistance of all Central Intelligence Agency components concerned, I reviewed the outstanding USIB requirements for overhead reconnaissance of the Taiwan Straits buildup area. This review took into account the overall substantive intelligence picture, the contribution of other sources and the continuing need for the type of information that may be expected from this activity. The Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance has considered this report on the program for reconnaissance and concurs with it.

25X1D 2. Responding to Presidential instructions of about a month ago, a reconnaissance program was inaugurated 20 June to cover the buildup area along the Taiwan Straits into which [redacted] collateral intelligence indicated a substantial Chinese Communist troop deployment had begun during June. 25X1C Five U-2 missions [redacted] have been flown. The results were considerably below maximum reasonable expectation because:

a. Weather, normal for this time of year in this area, was poor on several of these missions, diminishing useful coverage.

b. These missions were not inaugurated until the troop movement was substantially completed.

c. We lacked an adequate base for comparison to show new developments in the area, since our last coverage was in 1958-59 and of a relatively limited character.

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
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3. Despite these deficiencies, this photography has furnished the following intelligence of value which was unavailable from other sources:



4. Additional intelligence is needed which requires U-2 photography:

a. There is a requirement for thorough coverage of the area to provide a base against which to compare barracks construction and concentrations of naval craft.



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b. There is a requirement to pinpoint location of redeployed and regular troops and military installations.

c. A periodic check is needed to insure that railroad traffic and aircraft movements into the area do not indicate a further major deployment beyond the one which has just taken place.


5. At present there is relatively little risk in the coastal buildup area. The Chinese Communists track the aircraft but they have no interception or SA missile capability in this area of China.

*6. Accordingly, it is recommended that the program be continued on a scale which will provide weekly coverage of the Quemoy area and adjacent coastal areas and hinterland within an approximate 300-mile arc for two weeks, requiring two U-2 flights. After accomplishing these two missions, COMOR will study the coverage achieved and reevaluate the subsequent coverage needed.

RAY S. CLINE
Deputy Director (Intelligence)

*The State Department concurs in the statement of the requirements and the order of priority indicated. However, the Department of State representative abstains from the recommendations inasmuch as the recommendations imply political approval which is beyond his competence.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Photographic Reconnaissance of
North Vietnam and South China

1. At your direction, with the assistance of all Central Intelligence Agency components concerned, I reviewed the outstanding USIB requirements for overhead reconnaissance of North Vietnam and South China. This review took into account the overall substantive intelligence picture, the contribution of other sources and the continuing need for the type of information that may be expected from this activity. The Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance has considered this report on the program for reconnaissance and concurs with it.

2. Since the beginning of the North Vietnam program in January 1961, there have been 14 U-2 missions, the most recent having been flown 23 June 1962. In March 1962, one U-2 mission was flown in South China to cover priority targets along the North Vietnam and Laos borders plus military installations and transportation lines immediately supporting any troop buildup in this area.

3. This photography has furnished us complete coverage of North Vietnam's military installations and transportation net on the average of once a month, providing the following intelligence of value which was unavailable from other sources:

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
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5. At present there is little risk over North Vietnam and South China. The flights over these areas have been tracked but there is no weapons capability against the U-2 in the area.

*6. In view of continuing requirements for intelligence weighed against the fact that a good photographic intelligence base for comparisons is now available, it is recommended that the program continue on a reduced scale that would call for coverage of the entire North Vietnam area and priority strategic targets in South China once every two months. This requires on the order of one U-2 mission over North Vietnam monthly and one U-2 mission over South China monthly.

RAY S. CLINE
Deputy Director (Intelligence)



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
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Photographic Reconnaissance of Priority
Strategic Target Areas in Communist
China Other Than in the Taiwan Straits
Buildup Area and South China

1. At your direction, with the assistance of all Central Intelligence Agency components concerned, I reviewed the outstanding USIB requirements for overhead reconnaissance of priority strategic target areas in Communist China other than in the Taiwan Straits buildup area and South China. This review took into account the overall substantive intelligence picture, the contribution of other sources and the continuing need for the type of information that may be expected from this activity. The Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance has considered this report on the program for reconnaissance and concurs with it.

2. Since the beginning of the program in January 1962, there have been five U-2 missions [redacted] [redacted] over priority strategic targets in China other than in the Taiwan Straits buildup area and South China.

3. This photography has furnished intelligence of great value which was unavailable from other sources:



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
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
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4. Additional intelligence is needed which, particularly in view of the relative paucity of information from other sources, requires U-2 photography to supply:

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5. At present there is little risk from hostile action over China except in the few areas where operational SA-2 missile sites are deployed. The Chinese Communists track U-2 flights accurately but have no present capability for air interception. This relative invulnerability of the U-2 may be comparatively short-lived; it will certainly be reduced if additional SA-2 missiles are deployed.

*6. It is recommended that we proceed immediately with coverage of the remainder of the strategic targets in Northeast China, completing the task about one-half done by the very successful [] One additional mission will probably accomplish this. Next it is recommended that the highest priority targets in Central China not previously photographed, principally the Szechwan Basin, be covered. It is possible that two missions, achieved under optimum conditions, could accomplish this and thereby complete initial coverage of all the highest priority strategic targets in China. Certain of the strategic targets in China, particularly the missile test range and the Lanchow area, may require subsequent coverage but it is recommended that determination of this requirement await study of the intelligence resulting from the complete initial coverage.

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RAY S. CLINE
Deputy Director (Intelligence)

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Photographic Reconnaissance of Cuba

1. At your direction, with the assistance of all Central Intelligence Agency components concerned, I reviewed the outstanding USIB requirements for overhead reconnaissance of Cuba. This review took into account the overall substantive intelligence picture, the contribution of other sources and the continuing need for the type of information that may be expected from this activity. The Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance has considered this report on the program for reconnaissance and concurs with it.

2. Since the beginning of the program, 27 October 1960, there have been 39 U-2 missions over Cuba, giving us photography of high quality for the entire island.

3. This photography has furnished the following intelligence of value which was unavailable from other sources:

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5. At present there is very little risk over Cuba. There is no evidence that the Cubans have ever detected a U-2 mission and they do not now have a weapons capability against the U-2.

* 6. Accordingly, it is recommended that at this time the program continue on its present scale, which calls for coverage of the entire target area monthly. This requires two U-2 flights monthly.

RAY S. CLINE
Deputy-Director (Intelligence)

* The State Department concurs in the statement of the requirements and the order of priority indicated. However, the Department of State representative abstains from the recommendations inasmuch as the recommendations imply political approval which is beyond his competence.

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16--C/DMD/NPIC ——— 17
17--LS/CIA/PAD(NPIC)
18--TSO CIA
19--DDI(P) TCO
20--OCI TCO
21--OSI TCO
22--ORR TCO
23, 24--DDP TCO
25--DDR
26--AD/OSA
27--Intel/OSA
28--SO/OSA
29-31--C/SRS/OSA/DDR

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